Coming soon! And by soon, we mean 2025! No, 2030, or 2040 . . . |
After the pomp and circumstance the ceremonies had passed, Moses barged into Wagner's office. Why wasn't he allowed to retain his seat on the City Planning Committee? Wagner panicked. A mistake, said the newbie mayor. A mere oversight. It won't happen again. With that, the "Master Builder" walked into another office in city hall, helped himself to the proper stationary, and wrote himself another term to the City Planning Committee. Sign it, said the old man.
Question: Who does that? Who has more power than the mayor? Why should an unelected official have power of the will of the people? The Power Broker brilliantly documents Robert Moses' ascent to power, his abuse of power, and subsequent loss of power. All empires exceed their grasp at some point, and fall. The book made for a gripping read, more like a thriller than a historical record. And now that I've finished reading, I feel a little empty inside.
Never, ever trust a man who looks like Al Capone. |
That was, until I saw that the California High Speed Rail Authority has approved $68.4 billion in bonds for construction of a bullet train from Los Angeles to San Francisco. On the surface, this is good news. A high-speed rail line in the United States is more than five decades overdue (Japan's bullet train has been running since 1964, the same year Robert Moses ran the World's Fair finances straight into the ground). Problem is, the California State Legislature had only approved $45 billion. Before I read the power broker, I would have chalked this $23 billion error to human ineptitude. The likely reality is more sinister.
One tactic Robert Moses utilized to steamroll opposition to his government projects was to understate the costs. Once the project had started and the funds ran out, Moses would simply request more money from the state legislature or the city council. If we don't provide more funds, Moses would argue, all the money thus spent will have been for naught!
At the start of his career, few cared because his projects generally provided more good than bad. For Example, in the construction Jones Beach State Park, Robert Moses spent the entire budget allocation on the foundation for the bathhouses. Not the bathhouses themselves. The foundation. When he was done, few cared that he had gone over-budget because the finished product was so impressive.
When the finished product was not so impressive, the public got angry. The untold billions Moses spent on projects of absolutely no value to the city of New York, such as his many worthless expressways that provide no value to the city of New York, nor any convenience to the motorist--is a cost that New Yorkers are still paying today. 90 percent of New York State's public debt is attributable to ""Authorities," legal complexities that exist under the guise that a private development corporation can deliver results better than the government. Those who wish to see a return to the great public works projects of the 1960s, or the successful government economic policies of the 1960s would be wise to see the detriment of the Robert Moses governing style and the problems inherent with "authority."
In this case, liberals need to understand the case of ire against government spending. In the private sector, it is understood that to impress a customer or client, the business must under-promise and over-deliver. If a project is going cost $100,000, then provide an estimate for $100,000. Billing a customer for $60,000, then asking for $25,000, then $15,000, is a good way to gaureentee you won't see that customer again.
Will Democrats learn from this? Wouldn't it be easier to document the true costs of a project, up front, then explain the benefits? The other tactic--downplaying the costs and dealing with the fallout later, hasn't worked in decades. Robert Moses gave public works a bad name, and that was almost half a century ago. Boston's Big Dig, while a worthwhile endeavor, is probably the only large-scale public works project that has been able reach completion since the Johnson administration. And what good was done by under-selling the costs, or cutting corners in construction of the tunnel to save money? What good did that do?
What can we do? Heck, the next time your conservative friend rails about how the "government can't do anything right," just let them know that they are partially correct. They just need to substitute the word "government" with "private development corporation."